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 This project came into being largely as a result of the dissatisfaction I experienced 
with my own education in cinema studies as an undergraduate. More precisely, the 
frustration I felt was more often than not associated with the presentation and study of the 
cinema’s canonical texts. In other words, Hitchcock, Bergman, De Sica, Welles, Renoir, 
and all the others were taught as the examples with respect to their traditionally assigned 
periods, aesthetic schools, and national cinemas. At the time I grew suspicious of 
canonical thinking that seemed to lead one to believe that Ford only made westerns, or 
Godard and the French New Wave could be reduced to the use of jump cuts (or reduced 
to anything at all) for example.  I do not mean to suggest that canons are worthless, and 
should be abandoned; that’s hardly what I wish to accomplish. But instead it might serve 
us well to cease thinking about this practice uncritically and as a settled matter.   
 During this time as my frustrations grew, I also became deeply fascinated with 
avant-garde cinema, both as a cinephile and as a filmmaker. In other words, the cinema of 
Stan Brakhage, Michael Snow, Maya Deren, Ken Jacobs, and so many others create the 
perfect space for thought; that is, their films invite you to be a patient thinker, to dwell in 
image and sound without any kind of predetermined trajectory for thinking in this 
abstract space. I discovered that this is a cinema that also forces you to re-learn how to 




understanding of what can be or what can be thought. It is through this ethos of 
abstraction that I began to think about all cinema differently.  
 With this in mind, it should be no surprise why I was first drawn to Jean-Luc 
Godard’s Histoire(s) du cinema years later.  Histoire(s)is essentially an avant-garde 
project that simultaneously resists and partially reinforces all the canonized tendencies I 
grew to distrust. At the time, Godard’s project articulated through cinema itself my own 
desire for a radical reconfiguration of what cinema history is and how it can be told. 
Through all of Godard’s many montage sequences, superimposed images, and voice-
overs, new possibilities for considering how to think about cinema history came into 
being for me. This re-orientation towards looking at cinema itself for revealing its own 
history in movement is perhaps Histoire(s) defining feature.  It is with this defining 
feature in mind that my thinking here attempts to work through Histoire(s) du cinema and 
its possibility for the poetic revealing of cinema history.  
 In chapter one I examine the traditional discourses surrounding the formation 
historiography as a discipline through Hayden White’s thinking. After establishing the 
tension between art and science in play within the work historiography, I then give 
consideration to how cinema studies as a discipline confronts these various tensions in its 
own historical accounts. Finally, I turn toward Martin Heidegger’s thinking on re-
presentation to expose many of the historical discourses at work in cinema studies as 
enframed in “settled” thinking. I then offer the suggestion that cinema studies needs to 
give greater consideration to cinematic movement as a tangible quality of the medium 




 In chapter two, I attempt to establish the primacy of movement within film 
theory/history via close readings of Sergei Eisenstein’s thinking as well as Paul DeMan’s 
theoretical understanding of nominal definitions in language. I then suggest that a shift 
toward the figurative is necessary through DeMan’s notion of the vector in order to 
understand both movement and history. I close the chapter by suggesting that Godard’s 
Histoire(s) du Cinéma might serve as an example of this vectoral approach towards 
representing history in movement.  
Finally, in chapter three, I offer a close formal analysis of Godard’s Histoire(s) du 
Cinema framed through an understanding of de Man’s vector. Specific attention is given 
to the role of Godard’s aesthetic ideas in Histoire(s) and their ability to reveal the poetic 











“We have art in order to not perish of the truth”  
-Friedrich Nietzsche. 
 
Reflecting on the restrictive nature of disciplines of thought and the practice of 
historiography, Hayden White posits that: 
Every discipline, I suppose, is, as Nietzsche saw most 
clearly, constituted by what it forbids its practitioners to 
do. Every discipline is made of a set of restrictions on 
thought and imagination, and none is more hedged about 
with taboos than professional historiography – so much so 
that the so-called “historical method’ consists of little 
more than the injunction to ‘get the story straight’ and 
avoid both conceptual over determination and imaginative 
excess at any price1 
 
White’s succinct analysis of the rigid parameters of professional historiography offers 
much to think about here.  For instance, White’s account of the “historical method” 
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characterizes a practice that appears to be stymied by its own self-imposed limitations. 
For historians there is a very specific way in which one “writes” history that does not 
allow much deviation in terms of form or style. White’s thinking also highlights a very 
specific tension within the discipline of historiography between the impulse to “get the 
story straight” and “imaginative excess.”  In other words, the conventional ambition of 
historiography is to simply report the stories of time passed without any kind of 
imaginative intervention, embellishment, or stylistic flourish.    
And yet, is not historiography an inherently generative intervention on history by 
the imagination?  In order to “get the story straight,” historiographers must make choices 
fraught with stylistic, methodological, political, and even artistic implications. Just as a 
brief example, consider Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of America: 1492- Present.  
Working as an alternate or “corrective” account of American history, Zinn attempts to 
gives representation to those whose race, gender, and class have been marginalized by 
more dominant narratives generated by historians. In other words, Zinn’s project is to 
work against the hegemonic narrative of “ American History” as white, rich, and male by 
offering a set of particular case studies that highlight events associated with those who 
have been underrepresented or absent from traditional historical accounts.  Of course, 
Zinn’s project announces its stylistic, methodical, and political orientations writ large, but 
Zinn’s text offers a clear window to the way in which all historiography is generative in 
this vein.  To put it another way, the impulse to “get the story straight” can be created 
through any number of ideological, methodological, or stylistic frameworks. With this in 
mind, it appears that the distance between the realm of empiricism and the realm of 




limitations might initially dictate.  As we will see, the tension between what we might 
call the scientific/empiricist drive and the artistic practice of historiography is nothing 
new, but rather a longstanding issue for the discipline.   
 Historiography’s true disciplinary nature is perhaps anything but concrete.  As 
Hayden White makes clear, when pressed on the status of their profession historians have 
simply evaded clear definition:  
When criticized by social scientists for the softness of his 
method…the ambiguity of his sociological and 
psychological presuppositions, the historian responds that 
history has never claimed the status of pure science, that it 
depends as much upon intuitive as upon analytical 
methods…that historical judgments should not therefore be 
evaluated by critical standards properly applied only in 
mathematical and experimental disciplines. All of which 
suggests that history is a kind of art. But when reproached 
by literary artists … the historian falls back upon the view 
that history is after all a semi-science. 2 
 
When pressured to answer to the dual claim on their disciplinary origins, the historian 
seems to position his work as a kind of elusive object; a science when necessary, artistic 
practice when convenient.  White’s generalized take on the historian’s resistance to 
classify his or her place in the disciplines is perhaps suggestive of the uneasy relationship 
between art and science in the work of historiography. Art and science, as defined by the 
academy, are two distinct and frequently opposed disciplinary foundations. Art and 
science both attempt to explicate the world at large, but their inquires differ in scope and 
methodology in profound ways.  Reflecting on Nietzsche’s remark that opens this paper, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





it is art that gives us the possibility of life and all the variations of being in the world to 
write, speak, think, read, and create truths. In other words, the supreme tension between 
art and science for the academy lies in the way in which truth comes into being; for the 
artist, it is through a creative becoming, while for scientist it is a measurable and 
quantifiable phenomenon.  With all this in mind, it should then not be surprising that the 
historiographer has something of a bad name across the disciplines.  As Hayden White 
claims, because of the historian’s inability to be the “mediator” between art and science, 
he finds “resentment over what appears to be the historian’s bad faith in claiming the 
privilege of both the artist and the scientist while refusing to submit to the critical 
standards currently obtaining in either art or science.”3 In other words, because historians 
works under a completely different set of critical standards and take for granted the 
complicated position of their own practice across the disciplines, they find disapprobation 
from within both the arts and the sciences.  
 For White there are two specific causes for the assorted criticisms directed at the 
historian that come from other disciplines. First, the historian has “affected a kind of 
willful methodological naïveté” from its long standing practice of avoiding “monistic 
explanatory systems of a militant idealism in philosophy and an equally militant 
positivism in sciences.”4 Unlike philosophy, which is predicated on a set of monistic 
systems of thought such as materialism or phenomenology that attempt to give unity to 
their respective modes of inquiry, historians have resisted such hard line views in their 
methodology. However, as White notes, historian’s suspicions of thought systems have in 
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turn led to a near refusal of critical self analysis.5 This resistance to self-analysis is in part 
due to the increasingly specialized nature of academic work: “the ordinary historian, 
wrapped up in the search for an elusive document that will establish him as an authority 
in a narrowly defined field, has had little time to inform himself of the latest 
developments in more remote fields such as art and sciences.”6  Because of the insular 
nature of academic discourse and the specific demands of their disciplinary practice, 
historians have simply lost touch with what is happening in both art and science.  
 The second cause of the animosity directed toward the historian from other 
disciplines is perhaps a direct result of the historian’s lack of engagment with current 
artistic and scientific practices. Many historians still perceive themselves as being the 
mediator between art and science by offering a kind of “neutral” middle ground. 
However, this position is something of antiquated thought, as White explains: “that 
supposedly middle ground between art and science which many nineteenth-century 
historians occupied…has dissolved in the discovery of the common constructive 
character of both artistic and scientific statements.”7 As White explains, nineteenth-
century thinking posited a radical dissimilarity between art and science, largely founded 
on the Romantic artist’s distrust of science, and the scientist’s incomprehension of art.8  
With this in mind, the hostility directed toward the historian from other disciplines is 
largely due to sustained nineteenth- century thinking that that simply has not been 
corrected or updated within the historian’s discourse.  
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While the intellectual culture of the nineteenth century allowed for the clear 
division between art and science, modern criticism has been illuminated through 
psychology with a clearer understanding of the artistic and scientific processes.9   
White notes that, through the study of human synthesizing faculties, psychology has 
offered a window to the ways in which artists express their vision of the world, as well as 
how scientists develop hypotheses about it.  White goes on to explain that as we gain a 
better understanding of both art and science through more contemporary modes of 
thought it appears that “it is no longer obvious that the historian is especially qualified to 
play the mediating role.”10  As a result of their diminished function as mediator between 
art and science, White posits that “historians of this generation must be prepared to 
entertain the notion that history, as currently conceived, is a kind of historical accident, a 
product of a specific historical situation.”11  Of course, this “historical situation” is none 
other than the lingering cultural and intellectual discourses of the nineteenth century on 
art and science. As White succinctly notes, “if this is the case, then artists and social 
scientists alike are justified in criticizing historians, not because they study the past, but 
because they are studying it with bad science and bad art.”12  
 But what specifically is the “bad” science and “bad” art to which historians 
adhere so strongly? When positioning themselves in the realm of the sciences, historians 
appear to have a limited point of reference, as Hayden White explains, “when historians 
speak of themselves as scientists, they seem to be invoking a conception of science…that 
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has very little to do with the physical sciences as they have developed since Einstein and 
with the social sciences as they have evolved since Weber.”13  In other words, historians 
have been incredibly slow to recognize disciplinary advances such as the rise of cultural 
studies, particle physics, Neo-Marxism, and quantum mechanics just to name a few 
examples.14  More troubling for White is perhaps the way in which historians practice 
“science.” As White notes, “ many historians continue to treat their ‘facts’ as though they 
were ‘given’ and refuse to recognize, unlike most scientists, that they are not so much 
found as they are constructed by the kinds of questions which the investigator asks of the 
phenomena before him.”15 Unlike scientists who understand that the “scientific method” 
is in fact a method that generates results, historians seem to neglect the idea that their 
“facts” are also generated from a method of inquiry.  
The “art” of history fares no better under the current practices of the historian. 
When positioning themselves within the realm of art, White explains that historians 
“seem to have in mind a conception of art that would admit little more than the 
nineteenth- century novel as a paradigm”16 This narrow conception of art inevitably leads 
to some problematic habits. As White notes, historians act as if “the major, not to say the 
sole, purpose of art is to tell a story.”17  Of course, there are many other points of artistic 
reference for the historian to latch onto or identify with, and yet the majority of these 
artistic possibilities go ignored by the historian: “they certainly do not mean to identify 
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themselves with action painters, kinetic sculptors, or existential novelists, imagist poets, 
or nouvelle vague cinematographers.” 18 Positioning historiography within the same 
realm as abstract artistic processes would simply be too radical a proposition for the 
historian, despite the inherent abstractness of their profession.  Even as the primary mode 
of historiographic discourse, there is nothing inherently bad in telling a story; however, 
its nineteenth-century incarnation is not necessarily the only means available to the 
historian for the task. As we will see, this mode of thinking does not find a home only in 
the discipline of history proper, but also within other fields that feature historiographic 
discourses that are central to the scholarly concerns of their field.  
The Cinema and Historiography  
Like their colleagues in the history department, practitioners of cinema studies 
also face a collection of similar problems when it comes to representing the history of 
their medium of inquiry.  Over the last fifty years, cinema studies has generated a broad 
range of stylistic and synoptic means of writing a history of the seventh art. Approaches 
such as the production of “macro” historical accounts, the practice of “piecemeal 
history,” and stylistic periodization have all offered a specific way of writing cinema 
historiography.  To be clear, by no means are these three approaches the only available 
ways in which one can write film history. 19  For my purposes here I would merely like to 
identify them as the most dominant modes of cinema historiography at work in the 
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discipline. Moreover, these approaches employ a similar mode of historical story telling 
while at the same time adhering to the impulse to relay only the facts of history to their 
reader.  And yet, despite being a discipline whose central object of study is an artistic 
medium, avant-grade avenues for representing history are nearly non-existent in cinema 
studies. In the space that follows I will demonstrate how approaches such as “macro” 
history and “piecemeal” history not only dominate historiographical discourses in cinema 
studies, but also privilege an explicitly “given” and measurable means of representing 
history.  
First, what exactly are “macro” historical accounts? In cinema studies we can 
point to several examples of written histories that offer a totalizing account of the 
medium from its beginnings to its contemporary existence. For example, David Cook’s A 
History of Narrative Film, Robert Sklar’s Film: An International History of the Medium, 
and David Bordwell and Kirsten Thompson’s Film History: An Introduction are but three 
examples of contemporary “macro” historical accounts of the cinema.  In each instance, 
cinema history is divided into a set of temporal breaks that highlight technological 
innovations, genre developments, film style, the rise of specific national cinemas, or 
particular modes of production. More importantly, these temporal breaks serve as 
markers for the ordered periodization of cinema history.  
There are of course several periods that macro histories name, but as Mark Betz 
notes, “one of most consistent periodizations of film history involves the technological 
break of sound… between films made before 1927 and those made after.”20 The 
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distinction between “silent” and “sound” cinema represents perhaps the largest and most 
well-established standardization at work within cinema historiography. It is with this 
distinction between “sound” and “silent” film in mind that David Bordwell founds his 
understanding of what he calls “The Standard Version” of film history21. Bordwell points 
to the origins of the “Standard Version” in Robert Brasillich and Maurice Bardèche’s  
1935 “macro” history Historie du cinema. As Bordwell notes, Historie du cinema 
“codifies central tendencies of the ‘Standard Version’…the division into national schools, 
the emphasis upon celebrated creators, and the proposition that the history of film is best 
understood as a search for the distinct qualities of film as art.”22  According to Bordwell,  
Brasillich and Bardèche’s Historie du cinema has also been incredibly influential in 
establishing the practice of periodization as a common way of thinking about film history 
that extends to other early historians such as George Sadoul, and to a lesser extent André 
Bazin.23 
  In addition, yet another “standard” set of temporal distinctions can be located in 
the break between pre and post World War II cinema as characterized by Gilles Deleuze 
in his two Cinema volumes.  Despite Deleuze’s resistance to characterizations of his 
thinking as historical, the Cinema volumes do organize his philosophy of the cinema 
around a set of fairly broad historical or taxonomic “images” that come to illustrate the 
pre and post-war “break.”  In Cinema 1: The Movement Image, Deleuze focuses largely 
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on Soviet Montage, German Expressionism, slapstick comedy, and to some extent 
“classical” Hollywood cinema. Cinema 2: The Time Image Deleuze shifts his thinking to 
an almost exclusive examination of contemporary European Art Cinema. In other words, 
in order for Deleuze to even make his broader argument about the transition from the 
“movement-image” to the “time-image,” he must rely his own odd paradigms for cinema 
periodization.  Taken together, Deleuze’s Cinema volumes function as their own 
unorthodox “macro” history that both resists and adheres to more classical parameters of 
cinema periodization that have come before it.  
As much as “macro” historical accounts attempt to offer totalizing historical 
accounts of the cinema, there are of course always acknowledged gaps or omissions.  As 
a response to the lingering omissions offered by “macro” histories David Bordwell notes 
that “piecemeal” histories offered a smaller scale with which to make a historical inquiry: 
In the 1970’s younger historians began to doubt that one 
scholar could write a comprehensive history of style across 
the world. By concentrating more narrowly on a period, a 
line of development, or a single stylistic issue, they avoided 
the peaks-and-valley overview and began to study continuity 
and change on a more minute scale.24 
 
In other words, “Piecemeal” historical approaches could encapsulate research such as a 
close survey of the French New Wave, the stylistic development of deep focus 
cinematography, or a historical analysis of the Hollywood films of 1939 for example. 
Implicit within these smaller historical projects is a more granular approach to writing 
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and thinking about the cinema. Additionally, “piecemeal” projects may also serve as a 
corrective to many of the larger assumptions about cinema periods on display in “macro” 
historical accounts. For instance, Bordwell notes that early cinema scholarship has 
especially benefitted from more granular approaches to historiography by calling into 
question the linear progress of cinematic techniques (among many other assumptions) 
that macro accounts championed. 25  “Piecemeal” history has become an increasingly 
popular and dominant mode of writing cinema historiography over the last thirty years, 
largely as a result of the success this approach has attained in updating, refuting, or filling 
in the gaps left behind by “macro” accounts.  
 From this all too brief account of cinema historiography, it would appear that all 
the major approaches named above share a kind of collective impulse to measure and 
refine, to varying degrees of specificity, cinema’s history. With this in mind, it might be 
more appropriate to consider notions such as “macro” and “piecemeal history” as more 
strictly scientific in nature. In other words, the conventional practice of periodization that 
stems from “macro” accounts such as the “Standard Version” function more as a kind of 
“given” set of scientific principles that adhere to identifiable facts than a set of conceptual 
parameters open for revision. In other words, the prevalence of “macro” histories has 
produced a set of assumptions about historical periods that largely go unchallenged in 
any kind of similar scale. Moreover, “macro” historical accounts such as the “Standard 
Version” offer the unit of measurement from which cinema historiography does its 
various projects by telling a coherent story of the cinema; what does not measure up 
simply goes unconsidered or ignored.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“Piecemeal” approaches are similarly scientific as well in the sense that their 
primary function is to offer a set of highly granular and largely archive-driven 
historiographic accounts of the cinema. In other words, “piecemeal” accounts may offer 
specific revisions or corrections to “macro” accounts, but their historiographic impulse is 
the result of a highly calculated need to fill the gaps left open by larger scale historical 
accounts.  In this sense, “piecemeal” history functions as a kind of measured additive 
element to cinema historiography. It is in these granular accounts that we perceive the 
production of the “new” historiographic accounts. However, this “newness” that we 
might initially perceive is perhaps always in service to what has already been certified, 
made intelligible, or represented as fact. 
 
“Revealing” History 
 From Hayden White’s opening assessment of historiography, it would appear that 
the historian’s gravest offense is the untimeliness of his thought. However, White’s claim 
contains much more troubling ramifications than merely suggesting that historiography 
contains “antiquated” thinking. At stake in White’s understanding of historiography is the 
very place and function of representation itself. In other words, White’s suggestion that 
historiography is firmly entrenched in a specific way of thinking such as nineteenth- 
century, scientific, artistic, or any other epoch, only hints at the extent to which all 
historiography sets in place a world view that is determined in advance. We see this 
“settling” effect at work in cinema studies as well, through the development of the 




compare. In the space that follows I hope to both elucidate on this initial claim though a 
close reading of Martin Heidegger’s seminal essay “The Age of the World Picture,” and 
in turn offer a working suggestion for unsettling cinema history from such 
“technological” thinking. 
 To begin, it is perhaps best to give consideration to what Heidegger means by 
historiography when he speaks of it. For Heidegger, the methodology of historiographical 
discourse  “aims at representing what is fixed and stable and making history an object.”26 
As Heidegger notes, history only becomes an object when it is past, and in turn this “past-
ness” is what grants historiography the stability to channel “the always-has-been-once-
already, the comparable.”27  Heidegger explains that it is through the constant comparison 
of “everything with everything” that we find what is “intelligible, … certified, and 
established as the ground plan of history.”28   In other words, historiographical 
explanation takes great pains to verify, evaluate, and interpret the past only to fit it within 
the realm of what already exists or can already be determined. As Heidegger notes, “the 
sphere of historiographical research extends only so far as historiographical explanation 
reaches.”29 For Heidegger, it is in this limited purview of the already that history is made 
object and the true problem resides.  
 But how precisely does Heidegger come to locate the “already-ness” that resides 
in representation?  As Heidegger explains, “to represent means here: of oneself to set 
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something before oneself and to make secure what has been set in place, as something set 
in place.”30 In other words, representation sets something in place always in advance of 
oneself and in relation to oneself. Heidegger goes on to note that this “setting in place” is 
largely the function of “knowing, as research,” noting that “research has disposal over 
anything when it can either calculate it in its future course in advance or verify a 
calculation about its past.”31  To clarify, for Heidegger this kind of “knowing” is not 
something that is revealed through inquiry, but instead through re-presenting something 
that has already been determined in advance. It is through this “setting in place” of 
representation that history or nature becomes an “objectifying that masters…that drives 
everything together into the unity of that which is thus given the character of object.’32  In 
other words, re-presentation as “setting in place” excludes other ways of knowing by 
determining the grounds of knowledge in advance.  
 With all this in mind, it perhaps becomes clear how historiography could “settle” 
across a discipline. The very way in which historiographers come to “know” the past as 
representation excludes any other possibility since it is already determined within the 
limits of historiographical explanation. In cinema studies, we can point to the various 
“macro” historical accounts serving as a similar kind of horizon for knowledge in the 
discipline. Moreover, smaller “piecemeal” accounts only serve to reinforce an already 
established horizon for knowledge. This kind of thinking at work in re-presenting history 
is but one of the larger concerns that Heidegger had about the function of “enframing” or 
“setting in place”. Of primary concern for Heidegger were the larger ramifications of the 
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essence of technology on the modern world, and by extension the “technological” or 
“instrumental” way of thinking that also characterizes the modern age.   
  In his essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger gives 
consideration to technology as a far more sophisticated and deeply complicated concept 
than we might initially realize upon first pass. As Heidegger explains, technology is 
commonly thought of as wide assortment of instruments, tools, or machinery that humans 
invent, build, or exploit. But, Heidegger notes, this is only an “instrumental and 
anthropological” definition of technology.33 In other words, in this limited definition 
technology is only a means to and end or a result of human activity.   Rather than 
focusing on the more everyday nature of technology, Heidegger sets out to uncover the 
very “essence” of technology.  
 For Heidegger, the essence of modern technology lies in his understanding of the 
German word Gestell as an “enframing.” Enframing is then “the gathering together of the 
setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e. challenges him forth, to reveal the actual, in the 
mode of ordering, as standing reserve”34 In other words, enframing functions as a 
challenging-forth to human beings to reveal the truth (aletheia) as a kind of ready at hand 
resource to be collected.  With this in mind, modern technology is also revealing that 
orders truth in rather troubling ways, through a challenging-forth that understands nature 
and human beings as a supply source, or a “standing reserve.”35  For Heidegger, the most 
problematic aspect of modern technology’s enframing is that it “not only conceals a 
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former ways of revealing (bringing-forth) but also conceals revealing itself…i.e. truth 
properties”36 This is the danger that Heidegger comes to see in the rule of enframing; the 
destruction of a more “original revealing” and “ the call of more primal truth.”37 
 However, as dangerous and destructive as enframing may potentially be, 
Heidegger offers the bold suggestion that it may also contain its own “saving power.” 
Heidegger notes that the word “technology” carries with it two distinct meanings that 
deserve to be unpacked.  Stemming from the Greek word Technikon, Heidegger posits 
that the word “technology” belongs to “technē.”38  Heidegger then explains that there was 
once a time when technē was not just the name for technology, “but also for the arts of 
the mind and fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing forth, to poiēsis.”39 Heidegger goes on 
to explain that in ancient Greece art did not derive from the artistic and was not known in 
aesthetic terms, but instead merely as technē: 
It was a revealing that brought forth and made present, and 
therefore belonged within poiēsis. It was finally a revealing 
which holds complete sway in all the fine arts, in poetry, and 
in everything poetical that obtained poiēsis as its proper 
name.40 
 
"Truth" for Heidegger is a "revealing" (aletheia), the process of something "showing" 
itself. It is then in poetic revealing that Heidegger posits the ground for the possibility of 
understanding the world “as it is.”  With all this in mind, it should be clear that art's 
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relationship with the world is, in Heidegger's view, very different from technology's more 
destructive tendencies.  As Heidegger explains, art is considerably less concerned with 
measuring, classifying, and exploiting the resources of the world than it is with "taking 
part" in the process of coming-to-being and revealing the world “as it is.”  
 Heidegger’s understanding of both the destructive and saving powers of enframing 
(Gestell) are perhaps instructive for the larger discussion still very much at stake at here. 
If in fact cinema studies is suffering from a “technological” tendency in the way in which 
it writes its hisoriographic re-presentations (vorstellangen), then perhaps a more poetic 
mode of “revealing” or “bringing-forth” must be employed. Cinema, whose defining 
feature as medium is motion, would appear to resist historiographic practices that adhere 
to what is measurable, settled, or already defined. In other words, it might be best to treat 
historiographic inquiries in cinema studies less like a science as Hayden White defines it, 
or an agent of re-presenting as Heidegger might position the practice and more like an 
experimental or avant-garde practice. Working against the need to classify, measure, or 
limit, I propose that historical accounts must turn to thinking the cinema “as it is” in its 
“poetic revealing” as movement. It is only by orienting our “thinking” and our “knowing” 
toward movement that we can think cinema and its history in its coming-to-being. With 
this in mind, we must now ask what is cinematic movement? And more importantly, how 
does it grant us a means to “unsettle” our previous understanding of how cinema 








ON CINEMATIC MOVEMENT 
 
From the very beginning the cinema has always been a strange-thing.  Writing in 
1896 Maxim Gorky offers an illuminating description of his first encounter with this 
strange-thing via the Lumière Cinématographe: 
 Yesterday I was in the kingdom of shadows. If only you 
knew how strange it is to be there. There are no sounds, no 
colours. There everything- the earth, the trees, the people, 
the water, the air – is tinted in a grey monotone; in a grey 
sky there are grey rays of sunlight; in grey faces, grey eyes, 
and the leaves of the trees are grey like ashes.  This is not 
life but the shadow of life and this is not movement but the 
soundless shadow of movement.41 
 
What is most striking about Gorky’s description in this passage is not the image he paints 
of the haunted - otherworldly aesthetic of the silent Lumière film, but rather his reliance 
on figurative language to make sense of what is clearly not life or actual movement. .  
The world that Gorky sees for the first time in the dark of a Parisian café is not the world 
of the everyday, but a world of moving shadows that dance on the screen and seem to
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 only offer a kind of “one-off” impression of the everyday world.  Captured and later 
projected through the cinématographe, life and movement became “shadows;” though, 
we could just as easily say they became images or representations. In other words as an 
image, there is nothing real, actual, or living about life and movement in the cinema. This 
perhaps explains the reticence that seems to be present in Gorky’s description of his first 
encounter with the Lumière films; it’s simply not possible to account for this strange – 
cinema- thing within the framework of everyday language. With the language of the 
everyday unable to account for cinematic movement the only recourse left to Gorky was 
to think about the “soundless shadow of movement” through the figurative power of 
metaphor. To put it another way, Gorky’s recasting of movement in the cinema as the 
“shadow of movement” perhaps fully connotes the mystery, oddness, and vague 
familiarity of his experience and at the same time lays the groundwork for additional 
speculation/thought. Like movement itself there is nothing static about the various 
meanings offered by metaphoric description.  
 While Gorky’s first impressions of the Lumière cinématographe certainly offer an 
early indirect account of thinking cinematic movement figuratively, we perhaps find the 
clearest theoretical writing on the subject within Sergei Eisenstein’s Laocoön.  In the 
Laocoön Eisenstein attempts to make the case for cinema’s medium specificity through 
an exhaustive critical study that compares the function of montage within literature, 
painting, and cinema. Central to Eisenstein’s thinking about montage in the cinema is the 
distinction he refuses to make between montage cinema and cinema as a whole. As 
Eisenstein notes, “all cinema is montage cinema, for the simple reason that the most 




phenomenon.”42  All cinema is montage simply because cinematic movement is 
dependant upon the animation of a succession of static frames at a certain speed to 
produce the perceived effect of movement. Eisenstein names this phenomenon “micro 
montage” in the sense that the succession of static frames necessary to produce cinematic 
movement hinges on both the acts of juxtaposition and repetition needed to produce an 
effect that we are able to perceive: namely, an image of continuous movement.     
With Eisenstein’s initial thinking in mind, it’s clear that the most basic level of 
cinematic movement is dependent upon the “tricking” of our perception by turning static 
frames of movement into perceived continuous movement. Eisenstein calls this effect on 
our perception the “cinematic phenomenon” and goes on to explain: 
the cinematic phenomenon -the creation of motion out of 
the collision of two motionless forms – we are not dealing 
with natural, physical movement but with something that 
has to do with the way our perceptions work. This is not 
only the primary phenomenon for cinematic technique, it is 
above all the primary phenomenon of the human mind’s 
capacity to create images.43   
 
In other words, like images, the movement we see in the cinema is not actual, physical, or 
real, but rather suggestive and dependent upon our ability to perceive the rapid succession 
of static frames as the continuous image of movement.  As Eisenstein explains further 
“what occurs is not movement; instead our consciousness displays its ability to bring 
together two separate phenomena into a generalized image to merge two motionless 
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phases into an image of movement.”44 Again, we don’t experience actual movement in the 
cinema, but instead create a “generalized image” of movement from the way in which our 
mind interprets the rapid succession of static frames as continuous movement. We might 
just as easily say that all cinematic movement relies on the principle of metaphor to 
function, as a figurative formulation that must be perceived and constructed via thought, 
rather than experienced as actual.  
The distinction Eisenstein makes between actual movement and the image of 
movement as the “cinematic phenomenon” is crucial and seemingly forgotten within 
cinema studies.  As Eisenstein warns in the Laocoön, “any other interpretation of the 
basic phenomenon of cinema (and the corresponding conclusion to be drawn from it) 
would not only be factually incorrect but would furthermore be purely Impressionistic”45 
Perhaps this is the problem that explains our difficulty in describing cinematic 
movement: we’re simply too impressionistic in our accounts. Or, as Eisenstein phrases 
such impressionistic thinking/seeing, “the dominance of the retina of our eye, i.e. 
pictorial imprint, over the brain centres, i.e. over the reflected image, was an example of 
this trend.”46 Central to the aesthetic and intellectual ideology of impressionism was the 
privileging of immediate/instantaneous, subjective visual impressions over lingering 
thought or recollection:  
The impressionists do not allow visual impressions to be 
corrected on the basis of experience or recollection, since to 
do so would be to lose the authenticity of the impression 
and with it the truth; thus the outcome would be some 
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blurred compromise midway between true observation and 
mental interpretation.  The artist who paints an eye, a vase, 
a house or a tree rather than the impression of light and 
colour emitted by those objects is prone, in the 
impressionists’ view, to a similar delusion.  He is thinking 
instead of seeing.  Impressionism regards this kind of 
thinking as the artist’s gravest sin47 
 
In other words, artistic “authenticity” and “truth” rely on an immediate and singular 
perspective, as if the world could only be seen in the play of light and color. I don’t mean 
to suggest that impressionists aren’t capable of thinking, rather I want to highlight the 
seemingly sedimentary position of the “pictorial imprint” that is central to their artistic 
practice and intellectual ideology. The “pictorial imprint” so fundamental to the 
impressionist aesthetic is perhaps just that: an imprint or a fixed mark. The impressionist 
imprint is celebrated in its singular vision and totality as being a mark of uniqueness, a 
kind of artistic and intellectual tunnel vision if you will.  To put it another way, we might 
say that impressionists privilege the fixed indexical sign of the pictorial imprint as a 
singular totality capable of describing the world or a moment.  
 
Reading the Signs 101 
But, how is this impressionistic practice any different from the signs that we 
typically ascribe to the task of naming movement in the cinema?  The cinema’s unique 
ability in the plastic arts to put objects, worlds, or bodies in motion has certainly been a 
central preoccupation for those looking to make any kind of medium specific claim about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the cinema.  And yet, while movement is undoubtedly one of cinema’s defining qualities, 
it is also the most difficult to talk about in any concrete or fixed terms as evidenced by 
Gorky and Eisenstein’s thinking on the subject.  Within the field of cinema studies, a 
whole system of descriptive language has been developed to name the various motions, 
stutters, transitions, and moving sequences as measurable and determinable natural units. 
In other words, we might say that the common practice of categorizing, indexing, or 
naming movement is an inherently impressionistic enterprise in which the image of 
movement is made actual as an imprint or a fixed sign. 
 For example, reading any introductory film textbook will inevitably guide readers 
to thinking about movement as an editing tool via rhythm, beat, and tempo. As David 
Bordwell and Kristin Thompson point out in their introductory book Film Art: 
The rhythmic possibilities of editing emerge when several 
shot lengths form a discernable pattern.  A steady, metrical, 
beat can be established by making all the shots 
approximately the same length…steadily lengthening shots 
can generate a gradually slowing tempo, while successively 
shorter shots can create an accelerating one.48  
 
While it’s quite obvious that cinematic movement can function as a kind of rhythmic 
composition, which is an idea that Eisenstein took great interest in, Bordwell and 
Thompson’s understanding of this phenomenon simply ends with a counting of shot 
frames and rhythmic changes.  In other words, their project involves the location of 
movement as an actual, quantifiable, and ultimately concrete sign/impression. At the 
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same time, isn’t the very notion of mapping the conventions of musical rhythm, beat, and 
tempo onto the cinema a kind of metaphorical intervention in itself? As if we could ever 
escape figurative terms while making counted frames quantifiable/concrete units? 
Describing camera movement also proves to be just as much an impressionistic 
practice for cinema studies. From Bordwell and Thompson’s thinking, camera 
movements are capable of providing certain cues for understanding movement that can be 
read as actual: “it is difficult not to see camera movement as a substitute for our own 
movement.  The objects do not seem to swell or shrink.  We seem to approach or retreat 
from them. We are not, of course completely fooled.  We never forget that we are 
watching a film in a theater.  But camera movement provides several convincing cues for 
movement through space”49 And yet, in order for Bordwell and Thompson’s suggestion 
that camera movement may function as a substitute for own movement to work, we must 
assume that cinematic movements and our actual movements are one in the same.  The 
problem of course is that they never are. Moreover, the conflation between actual 
movement and cinematic movement in this passage also forecloses the possibility that 
movement can be manipulated to “shrink” or “swell” since any movement in the cinema 
is inevitably an image of movement.  
Additionally, this mapping of actual movement onto cinematic movement also 
produces specific ways of locating meaning in camera techniques such as pans, tilts, 
tracking shots, and dolly shots through a taxonomy of “convincing cues.” In this schema, 
pans, tilts, tracking shots, and various other camera movements are reduced to the status 
of signs/imprints capable of generating a set of predetermined meanings/functions: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




“tracking and crane shots supply continually changing perspectives on passing 
objects…pan and tilt shots present space as continuous, both horizontally and 
vertically”50 No doubt these brief descriptions offer the classic narrative for 
understanding these particular cinematic movements, but they also take for granted the 
contingency of meaning and figurative potential in various techniques available to 
filmmakers in every variation of movement.  In other words, the numerous classical 
descriptions of cinematic movement give us names to images of movement and nothing 
more; they can only be dead signs at best.  
 
Deleuze’s Movement-Images 
As we’ve seen, classical descriptions of cinematic movement only reinforce a 
static understanding of movement that misses the breadth of possible meaning contained 
in motion. But how have thinkers outside of cinema studies thought of cinematic 
movement? Of the numerous attempts to think cinematic movement perhaps the most 
exhaustive study of the cinema’s various movements can be found in the first volume of 
Gilles Deleuze’s two-volume project on the cinema.  Central to Deleuze’s understanding 
of movement in The Movement-Image is his insistence that the logic of the “sensory-
motor schema” be the guiding principle from which a taxonomy of image-signs can be 
deployed.  In other words, Newtonian physics figures prominently not only in Deleuze’s 
taxonomy of image-signs that determine perception, emotion, and action, but also in his 
understanding of the ontology of the image that recasts images as matter – light in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




movement; or rather, a physics of thought/thinking in light. This is of course a much 
more abstract consideration of the cinema than what Bordwell and Thompson offer, but 
as we’ll see, Deleuze’s theory of movement also succumbs to a tendency to “settle” 
movement as a fixed sign.  
Deleuze’s ontology of the cinema aside, of principal interest to us here is his 
preoccupation with the creation of a taxonomy of image-signs in the Movement-Image.  
Borrowing heavily from both Henri Bergson and C.S. Pierce, Deleuze provides us with a 
staggering eighteen image-signs (more or less) over the course of both The Movement-
Image and The Time-Image.  For the sake of brevity I’d like to focus my analysis on 
Deleuze’s first three image-signs of the movement-image: the perception-image, the 
action-image, and the affection image.  
Stemming from a close of reading of Bergson’s understanding of perception from 
Matter and Memory Deleuze creates the three principal image signs, each related as 
Ronold Bogue explains, “in a specific way to the interval of a living center of 
indetermination.”51 For Deleuze and Bergson this “centre of indetermination” is none 
other than the human brain. As Deleuze elucidates the brain acts as a kind of plane from 
which an interval of movements is produced: “the brain is nothing but this – an interval, a 
gap between action and reaction. The brain is certainly not a centre of images from which 
one could begin, but itself constitutes one special image among others”52 From the 
interval or “gap between action and reaction” located on the brain a living image is 
produced that is directly tied to the sensory-motor schema as, “a kind of relay system, 
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receiving the external movements of other entities and converting them into the 
movements of its own actions.”53  Deleuze points out that there are two sides to this gap 
between action and reaction on the brain: perception and action.  
According to Deleuze, the perception of a thing and the thing itself becomes “one 
in the same image.”54  However, Deleuze also posits that in perception we perceive the 
thing, minus that which does not interest by way of a kind of selective re-framing of 
incoming movements. This is the perception-image. Deleuze goes on to elaborate on the 
subtractive function of the perception-image by saying, “it subtracts from the thing 
whatever does not interest it.  But, conversely the thing itself must be presented in itself 
as a complete, immediate, diffuse perception”55 It is only from a kind of objective total-
frame that the perception-image performs its selective function.  
On the opposite side of the gap, or outgoing interval between action and reaction 
is the action-image. Deleuze comments that the transition from perception to action is 
“imperceptible” and likens the action image to, “the incurving of the universe, which 
simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible action on 
things”56  Deleuze goes on to illuminate the function of the action-image through a 
linguistic analogy, “just as perception relates movement to ‘bodies’ (nouns), that is to 
rigid objects which will serve as moving bodies or as things moved, action relates 
movement to ‘acts’ (verbs) which will be the design for an assumed end result”57  In 
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other words, the action-image anticipates possible movement or action as well as puts 
virtual action into motion; as a verb it makes or anticipates an action.  
Finally, the affection-image occupies the interval between perception and action.  
As Deleuze explains, the affection-image “surges in the centre of indetermination that is 
to say in the subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a 
hesitant action…or, the way in which the subject perceives itself, or rather experiences 
itself or feels itself ‘from the inside.’ It relates movement to a ‘quality as a lived state 
(adjective)”58.   In addition, Deleuze also states that in the affection-image movement is 
absorbed and in turn works as “a kind of motor tendency on a sensible nerve, that is, a 
motor effort on an immobilized receptive plate.”59  We might say that the affection image 
works as a kind of surface, relaying incoming perceptions and outgoing action. As a 
surface capable of absorption, the affection image also bridges the gap between 
perception and action where sensation or feeling can be expressed. 
While by no means a complete assessment of Deleuze’s image-sign taxonomy, 
it’s clear that each of the three basic movement-images performs very specific descriptive 
tasks pertaining to cinematic movement: once again via their short-hand linguistic labels, 
perception-image as noun, action-image and verb, and affection-image as adjective. 
Despite the flexibility and interplay between the various movement-images, Deleuze’s 
taxonomy of image-signs remains at best purely impressionistic and ultimately beholden 
to a system of fixed image-signs.  Like impressionist practices, Deleuze’s taxonomy of 
image-signs (or any taxonomy for that matter) carry out an indexical function, that is 
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maintaining and mapping a set descriptive criteria to images of movement. However 
comprehensive or “natural” Deleuze’s taxonomy of image-signs may want to be, the 
problems of intelligibility still persist with every variation in movement.   To be clear, it 
appears that any attempt to describe cinematic movement within a system of meaning 
(Deleuze’s, Newtonian physics, Bordwell and Thompson’s, etc.) is doomed to failure 
since movement is never static.  
The Movement Metaphor 
So, what is to be done?  If taxonomies, systems, or categories of thinking about 
cinematic movement only lead us to more “static” signs surely we must still find a way to 
say something about cinematic movement? Perhaps, a possible remedy to this problem 
can be found in the beginnings of film theorization.  It seems clear that we need a less 
“settled” account of cinematic movement in favor of a return to the metaphoric potential 
of thinking cinematic movement as the image of movement. In other words we need to 
reestablish the primacy of Eisenstein’s sentiment that, “in cinema, movement is not 
actual, but is an image of movement.”60 We might just as well say, “In cinema, movement 
is not actual, but is metaphorical.” As Eisenstein warned earlier, any other account of 
cinematic movement would be impressionistic, or rather beholden to categories of signs.  
To confront the problem of understanding cinematic movement’s always present 
figurative potential I wish to draw from Paul de Man’s discussion of ‘nominal 
definitions” and “primitive words” from his essay “Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion.”  In 
de Man’s thinking a primitive word does not function as a sign or a name, but instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




operates as a vectoral trope through which a figural signifying function is performed. The 
vector, as deMan sees it, can only gesture toward potential signification, never toward a 
fixed representation or a sign. With de Man’s thinking in mind, to speak about any 
movement one must always speak in figurative language since figurative language itself 
functions as a kind of semantic movement. This is the politics of movement: dissipating 
vectoral force and figurative formulation, the signs are never fixed.  
De Man begins his discussion of Pascal’s Pensées in “Allegory of Persuasion” in 
a place perhaps all too appropriate for our discussion at hand here: by considering 
allegory.  For de Man, attempts to define allegory, like cinematic movement for us, run 
into a great deal of difficulty. As de Man explains, “allegory is sequential and narrative, 
yet the topic of its narrative is not necessarily temporal at all, thus raising the question of 
the referential status of a text whose semantic function, though strongly in evidence, is 
not primarily determined by mimetic moments; more than ordinary modes of fiction, 
allegory is at the furthest possible remove from historiography”61 In other words, in order 
for allegory to perform its figurative function it does not blindly imitate or mime its 
coded material; rather, it allows what is to be decoded to loom somewhere outside literal 
interpretation. As de Man explains via Hegel, allegory and enigma are hardly one in the 
same, and posits, “Hegel rightly distinguishes between allegory and enigma in terms of 
allegory’s ‘aim for the most complete clarity, so that the external means it uses must be 
as transparent as possible with regard to the meaning it is to make apparent”62 We might 
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say, then that allegory is simultaneously veiled to our perception and at the same time 
obvious to those who look for it and can decode its material.  
A bit later in the essay de Man goes on to explain the complicated function of 
allegory in relation to epistemology when he suggets, “allegory is the purveyor of 
demanding truths, and thus its burden is to articulate an epistemological order of truth 
and deceit with a narrative or compositional order of persuasion”63 Since allegory works 
by providing both apparent and veiled meanings within a persuasive narrative its 
epistemology carries with it a dual function, always fluctuating between truth and deceit. 
Or as deMan puts it: “in a stable system of signification, such an articulation is not 
problematic; a representation is, for example, persuasive and convincing to the extent that 
it is faithful, exactly in the same manner that an argument is persuasive to the extent that 
it is truthful.  Persuasion and proof should not, in principle, be distinct from each other, 
and it would not occur to a mathematician to call his proofs allegories.”64 Here we see de 
Man attempt to trouble the stability that epistemological claims imply; in a sense, they 
always perform a kind of persuasive function by way of the verification of their sign and 
claim to a “truth.” However, de Man is quick to point out that allegory makes this 
alignment between epistemology and proof much more complicated.  As de Man laments, 
“why is it that texts that attempt the articulation of epistemology with persuasion turn out 
to be inconclusive about their own intelligibility in the same manner and for the same 
reasons that produce allegory?” 65  In other words, the relationship between epistemology 
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and persuasion can only be at best expressed in the referentially indirect terms of allegory 
because both epistemology and persuasion are unstable discursive modes.  
In de Man’s discussion of the distinction between nominal and real definitions in 
Pascal’s thinking from the Réflexions, we perhaps witness this breakdown of 
epistemology and persuasion. In this section de Man begins locating the importance of 
geometry within Pascal’s thinking where we only encounter definitions of name that are 
clearly designated and known in quantifiable terms. This kind of “stenography” as de 
Man describes it, performs the task of denomination without contradiction since nominal 
definitions are always clearly designated.  On the other hand, real definitions are much 
more difficult to pin down. As de Man explains, “they are actually not definitions, but 
axioms, or even more frequently, propositions that need to be proven.”66  DeMan points 
out that the confusion between the two types of definitions is one of the classic problems 
within philosophy.  But for Pascal, his reliance on geometry proves useful in maintaining 
the distinction between nominal and real definitions.  
It should come as no surprise that deMan is quick to trouble Pascal’s claim to 
geometry as a system capable of making such a distinction between the two definitions.  
As deMan explains, “as soon as it is enunciated, the apparently simple definition of 
definition runs into complications, for the text glides almost imperceptibly from the 
discussion of nominal definition to that of what is it calls ‘primitive words,’ which are not 
subject to definition at all, since their pretended definitions are infinite regresses of 
accumulated tautologies”67 To put it another way, attached to “primitive words” is a pre-
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existing linguistic register that guarantees a basic intelligibility despite the fact that 
definition remains an impossibility. DeMan goes on to explain that if primitive words 
have a natural meaning as such, they would have to be universal “like the science that 
operates with these words.”68 However, even Pascal doesn’t believe this to be the case, 
since it’s impossible to say that everyone has the same idea about the definition of a 
particular object.  Instead Pascal qualifies his thinking by stating, “it’s not the nature of 
these things which I declare to be known by all, but simply the relationship between the 
name and the thing, so that on hearing the expression time, all turn (or direct) the mind 
toward the same entity”69 To clarify, de Man comes to posit that Pascal’s “primitive 
word,” “does not function as a sign or a name, as was the case with nominal definitions, 
but as a vector, a directional motion that is manifest only as a turn, since the target toward 
which it turns remains unknown.  In other words, the sign has become a trope, a 
substitutive relationship that has to posit a meaning whose existence cannot be verified, 
but that confers upon the sign an unavoidable signifying function.”70   
There is much to consider in these brief lines that perhaps relates directly to the 
impossibility of fixed or stable definition. First, in these lines deMan extends Pascal’s 
original thinking on the universality of recognizing the relationship between a name and a 
thing to the realm of speculative or figural reading. We might say that deMan’s turn 
towards the physics of movement in describing the relationship between a thing and its 
name is itself an act of figural speech; we first must know what a vector is, decode it, and 
recognize its potential application within the realm of language.  This adds yet another 
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layer to an already confounding problem of recognizing the relationship between a thing 
and its name.  Oddly enough, a vector in physics and mathematics is typically 
characterized as having a quantifiable force attached to its directional motion/movement.   
However, de Man’s usage of the vector in this passage seems to forgo any notion of 
concrete quantifiable force but rather only suggests the force of a directional movement 
toward an unknown target. It is perhaps no surprise that de Man comes to recognize this 
vectoral function of the sign as a kind of trope since it can only perform what we might 
call a figural signifying function to a meaning(s) that cannot be quantitatively conferred; 
in other words, it can only gesture toward potential signification, rather than any fixed 
representation of a sign. 
 Is this not what cinematic movement does?  As cinematic movement is always 
allegorical, metaphorical, or figurative de Man’s understanding of the vector offers a 
compelling framework to think cinematic movement as the image of movement. To put it 
another way, words, like movement itself, de Man’s vectoral trope is also grounded as a 
semantically contingent force.  Rather than acting as a “settling” enterprise such as 
Deleuze’s taxonomy of image-signs or the classical names we attribute to cinematic 
movement, de Man’s vectoral trope offers only a dissipating suggestive force that can be 
contingently ascribed to movement in the cinema. Movements are not reduced to fixed or 
static signs or re-presentations, but are instead always suggestive of the figurative 
potential of movement.  
Through the thinking advanced above, it is clear that cinematic movement is an 
unsettling force, but how might a turn to towards cinematic movement come to trouble 




movement take shape? One possible example of both deMan’s vector and cinema history 
as movement is Jean Luc Godard’s multi chapter video-art project Histoire(s) du cinéma.  
Histoire(s) is much less a history of the cinema than it is a moving archive of cinema 
history.  Godard’s project is a video labyrinth of memories and references from hundreds 
of films, texts, and works of art that are set in dialogue with one another through a variety 
of formal effects such as superimposition, juxtaposition, and movement.   In the next 
chapter I wish to posit that Histoire(s) appears to offer something very different from a 
“settled” historical discourse that conventional “macro” histories ascribe to.  Instead, 








HISTORIE(S) DU CINÉMA AND POETIC REVEALING 
 
 
DeMan’s understanding of the vector is especially important for our discussion of the 
type of historiography that Histoire(s) du cinéma does. Rather than positing history as 
any kind of fixed sign, Histoire(s) fully embraces the unsettled possibility of thought and 
figurative potential of history as a vector told through video superimposition, montage, 
and moving images. With this in mind, Histoire(s) du cinéma offers the promise of 
encountering the unexpected, both in thought and in the images it produces. With this in 
mind, I would like to devote the space the follows to a closer exploration of Godard’s 
project, by focusing on a number of sequences and images from Histoire(s) du cinema 
that point to the possibility of thinking about history in movement.  
While one could locate a seemingly infinite number of examples, I’d like to point 
to a sequence early in the opening chapter “Toutes les Histoires,” to illustrate a common 
example of how Godard unsettles the practice of periodization common to “macro” 
historical accounts through montage. The sequence begins with a transition between 




Hollywood musical Band Wagon.  In the scene from Faust we see the character 
Mephisto appear in a burst of flames before Faust, who is shown sleeping on the ground 
in a long static shot accompanied by block text that reads, “LE CINEMA SUBSTITUTE” 
superimposed over the image. In response to the sudden appearance of the new mystical 
visitor in the frame, Faust jumps up from ground in surprise. We then briefly see the 
image of actress Cyd Charisse from Bandwagon seated at a bar wearing a black trench 
coat superimposed over the image of Faust rising to his feet. Godard then dissolves back 
to the scene from Bandwagon where we are shown a medium shot of Cyd Charisse as she 
gets up from her seat at the bar and takes off her coat to reveal a stunning sequined red 
dress. Another dissolve back to Faust shows us Mephisto tipping his hat to Faust.  
Godard then dissolves back to Bandwagon once more, and we see Cyd Charisse in a 
medium shot dance across the bar toward a dapper looking Fred Astaire. Cyd Charisse 
seductively circles around Fred Astaire with her dance and then puts her arms around his 
head as she stands in front of him.  In the same medium shot, we then see Fred Astaire 
raise his arm to reveal that he is holding a revolver of some kind. Godard then dissolves 
back to the scene from Faust and we once again see superimposed block text over the 
image that reads “CINEMA SUBSTITUTE.” Finally, Godard cuts to black and then cuts 
back to the scene from Bandwagon with the same text superimposed over the image.  
There is much to unpack here, but primarily I’d like to highlight the ways in 
which this sequence does the work of deMan’s vector. In other words, what does this 
juxtaposition point to?  The most obvious thread of thinking present in this montage 
sequence is the narrative connection that both Faust and Bandwagon share.  In 




restaging of Faust that ends up going terribly awry. In the resulting chaos from the stage 
production love blooms between Fred Astaire’s Tony and Cyd Charisse’s Gabrielle. 
However, I believe this narrative connection is less important than what this sequence 
unsettles in terms of historical representation and the very function of its images. To put 
it another way, how does the juxtaposition of a silent film and a color Hollywood film 
open up new possibilities for thinking? Do we need to think in terms of historical period 
at all?     
To show an act of revealing in the cinema, which I believe the sequences from 
both films demonstrate, it doesn’t matter if one film is shot in black and white and the 
other is shot in color; or if one film is shot at twenty four frames per second and the other 
at eighteen.  What I am saying is that both Bandwagon and Faust reveal something in 
their respective frames when taken together: the production of a new abstract thought. 
The transition from an image of the devil appearing (Mephisto) to a red dress under a 
coat carries with a certain abstract potential for meaning. In other words, one possible 
way of reading this montage sequence is that it points to the popular phrase “devil in a 
red dress” by virtue of the two juxtaposed images. However, I believe the linking 
involved here does not settle on Cyd Charisse with this distinction, but perhaps grants all 
of cinema this title. Placing images from chronologically distinct eras next to one another 
in this playful manner smooths over the tendency we have to think of them historically, at 
least temporarily.  In other words, when combined we can unquestionably locate all of 
their distinct and periodized differences, but Godard’s montage also points to their 
combined production of a new thought; an unforeseen verctoral force as the phrase “devil 




As much as montage points to new vectoral possibilities, Godard’s use of various 
superimposed images throughout Histoire(s) perhaps allows for even more unexpected 
ways of thinking. While there are hundreds, if not thousands of possible examples of this 
type of technique, I’d like to draw from a pair of sequences that use superimposition to 
make some rather intriguing historical claims. The first sequence, comes from the section 
“une vague nouvelle” and begins with a black and white still image of Sergei Eisenstein 
seated at an editing bench looking at a film strip. Superimposed onto this image in the left 
corner of the frame, is the non-static close up of Anna Karina’s face from Une femme est 
une femme. In this sequence we see her rest her head on hands and look up into the 
distance. As this sequence unfolds, we also see sumperimposed block text over both the 
Eisenstein image and the Karina image that transitions from BEAU MONTAGE, to 
MONTAGE MON BEAU, to finally MON BEAU SOUCI. Finally, Godard then cuts to a 
composite sumperimposed image of Ana Karina and an image of the sleeping lion statue 
from Eisenstein’s Potemkin.  
Unlike a dissolve that only briefly allows for the simultaneous meeting of the 
arriving and departing images, a composite superimposition like the one described above 
offers a realm of true co-existence for the collective images or texts that share a frame. 
With this in mind, it becomes much more difficult to locate well-defined spatial or 
temporal orientations within the composite image itself. Rather than attempt to separate 
and measure the different individual particulars at work in this composite image, Karina, 
Eisenstein, Godard, I’m much more interested in sussing out what their combined 
presence says. In other words, what does this composite image point to? What does it say 




As striking as the images of Karina and Eisenstein are, I’m first intrigued by 
Godard’s use of textual superimposition. There is a larger idea at stake here, a thought 
about “BEAU MONTAGE” or beautiful montage. What is beautiful montage? What 
brings this into being? The textual reference in this sequence to Godard’s Cahiers du 
cinma essay “Montage, Mon Beau Souci” perhaps illuminates this question.  Writing on 
the use of montage in Cahiers du cinéma, Godard notes:  
Cutting on a look is almost the definition of montage…It is, 
in effect, to bring out the soul under the spirit, the passion 
behind the intrigue, to make the heart prevail over the 
intelligence by destroying the notion of space in favour of 
that of time.71 
 
In other words, montage allows for a poetic revealing, the bearing of the soul and 
primacy of the heart through a look.  Of course, the “look” on display in Godard’s 
sequence is Karina’s look that seems to initially point to nowhere specific. However, in 
cutting from Karina’s look to the new composite image of Karina and Eisenstein’s 
Potemkin lion, Godard’s theory is put into action. This is beautiful montage: from a look 
to a thought.  
 But, what larger ideas might this look point to? Why do Ana Karina and the 
Potemkin lion meet in the same frame? One possible way of reading this sequence would 
suggest that Godard is attempting to draw a kind of superficial equivalence between 
himself and Eisenstein. In other words, both are theorists and practitioners of montage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





who see its potential for abstract thought when employed artistically.72  On the other 
hand, the composite image of Ana Karina and the Potemkin lion is much more 
confounding. Both images are well known within their respective historical periods, each 
a famous symbol within a movement or aesthetic school (French New Wave and Soviet 
Montage respectively).  And yet, both Karina and the lion statue appear to sleeping in the 
sequence that Godard shows us. Perhaps then the larger point at stake is the notion that 
montage is the element that brings life to the image, and in turn animates its existence; or 
in Godard’s terms gives cinema its “heart.” However, this is not just an aesthetic claim, 
but rather a historical claim for the virtue of montage as well. In other words, the 
theoretical and historical shift from “montage” cinema to “mise en scene” as documented 
by Andre Bazin and other critics marked a certain loss for montage as an art form. 
Godard’s brief sequence here, and the larger aesthetic project of Histoire(s) du cinéma 
challenge this assumption writ large. For Godard, montage is the “heart” of cinema. 
There is no substitute.  
Yet another example of Godard’s use of superimposition can be found in the “une 
‘vague nouvelle’ chapter that also features a pair of symbolic figures of the French New 
Wave. For instance, in this sequence New Wave supporter Henri Langlois finds his 
equivalent with the Lumière brothers via video superimposition and the New Wave’s 
reverence for Borzage, and Murnau is found once more after being buried deep the 
archive.  
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 The image of Henri Langlois, one of the founders of the Cinémathèque Française, 
appears several times throughout Histoire(s) du Cinéma in several chapters, however 
never as prominently as they do in” une vague nouvelle.” For example, midway through 
this chapter we find a composite video superimposition comprised of a color Lumière 
cinématographe poster that features an angel on the left and the black and white image of 
Langlois posed with a cinématographe on the right.  Rather than being layered on top of 
each other the composite image presents its component images (the angel/Langlois) as 
determinable spatial equivalents. The component images in the angel/Langlois image 
seem to co-habitate with spatial boundaries that are largely well defined, split, as they 
are, down the middle of the frame.  To this end, the juxtaposition of Langlois and the 
Lumière angel produces a historical vector; a figurative representation of not only 
historical co-mingling but also of a suggestive variation in meaning.  
 For example, if we read the spatial division in the frame as equivalential then it’s 
possible to assume that the composite image suggests that both Langlois and the Lumière 
are of divine origin.  Aesthetically speaking Langlois has never looked more saintly than 
he does here juxtaposed with an angel. In other words, this is Godard’s creation scene, 
the site where both the Lumière brothers and Langlois gave birth to a cinema (Langlois 
the New Wave and the Lumière’s early cinema respectively).  
 Aside from this video superimposition, the specter of Langlois appears again later 
in chapter 3B during a Godard voice over that recounts the coming into being of the New 
Wave.  Over an image of Napoleon in a small sailboat at sea from Abel Gance’s 
Napoleon we hear Godard say, “One evening we went to Henri Langlois’ house and then 




everyone. Not for us. Everyone but us. Because true cinema was the kind that couldn’t be 
seen. That was the only kind.”  
Very shortly after Godard’s statement we “see” the founding cinema of the New 
Wave that was un-seen through a brief sequence of Frank Borzage’s The River (La femme 
au corbeau) where we find the image of a man on his back floating toward Mary Duncan 
who sits on a nearby rock on a river shore. During this sequence Godard’s narration once 
again seems to support the invisible status of the New Wave’s cinema when he says, “But 
we would never see La femme au corbeau. We had to love it blindly. And by heart.”  
In other words, this is Godard’s story of the New Wave’s origin, founded not only in the 
“belief” of Langlois’ pedagogy but also in a kind of cinephiliac reverence for a body of 
cinema that remains “un-seen” as an absent presence; out of reach to those who don’t 
“see”, or don’t “believe.” Godard’s characterization of the New Wave’s religiosity 
towards “invisible” cinema is further supported during a city sequence from Murnau’s 
Sunrise where we hear yet another voice over by Godard elaborate on his thinking where 
he states, “because already forgotten. Still banned. Always invisible. Such was our 
cinema. And it stayed with me. And Langlois confirmed it.  That is the precise word.”  
  What is most striking about Godard’s succinct creation story of the New Wave is 
that it is without question very different from any of the popularized historical discourses 
of the New Wave’s beginnings.  Oddly enough, the notion that one could see the 
beginnings of the New Wave in the citations or references of Rossellini, Hitchcock, 
Hawks, Renoir etc, in the films of the New Wave appears to be troubled here. Godard’s 




account for the appearance of images and sequences from a cinema that is positioned and 
named as “invisible?”  Firstly, we would do well to perhaps add some degree of nuance 
to Godard’s figurative use of “invisible” here; obviously we can see the images, instead 
we might say these “invisible images” of The River and Sunrise are under seen or at least 
buried deep in the bowels of the archive. It is important to point out that Godard is largely 
talking about a reverence for “lost” or incomplete films, films that can typically only be 
seen as fragments or stills. They are “invisible” in the sense that their existence isn’t 
immediately apparent; like myths waiting to be retold once again.   
However, Histoire(s) du cinema appears to do something much more complicated 
than simply make apparent images that are often in the margins of the archive. Might we 
say instead, something vectoral happens here? In these sequences isn’t the “invisible” 
cinema of the New Wave already recast as something of an abstraction? The figurative 
re-arranging of the fragments of this “invisible” cinema in Godard’s frame manage to 
create a new nexus of suggestive forces that open up a multitude of historical vectors. In 
the example here, we find a different reading (another story) of the New Wave’s 
beginning, one vector of many in the historical plurality that Histoire(s) gives 
representation to. 
 
Towards an Apprenticeship 
Late chapter 3B we find Godard sitting on a bench reading a book near a doorway 
with an image of Vertigo’s redwood forest superimposed over him; a man and a woman 




“yes, interesting stuff,” however the woman remarks in disagreement, exclaiming, “tons 
of pictures of works, never any people!”  The man than offers the answer, “that’s the 
New Wave. Auteur Theory. By authors. Works!”  Godard then lifts his head out of his 
book to agree with man saying, “your friend is right mademoiselle. Works first, the men 
after.”  The women later returns again only to accuse Godard of “having no heart,” to 
which Godard retorts, “we can film work, not hearts.”  In a fairly lengthy speech Godard 
claims that we are living in a period where we have “too many hands and not enough 
hearts” and the real challenge (of artistic production, labor practices, etc.) is to ultimately 
work with our hearts.   Godard then goes on to claim that he knows no era “that lacked 
work for all its hearts.” Immediately after this claim, we see a brief montage of images of 
Jaques Becker, Roberto Rossellini, George Fanju, and Jean Pierre Melville . In response 
we hear the voice of the woman from the previous sequence ask “all the same, Becker, 
Rossellini, Melville, Franju, Jacques Demy, Truffaut. You knew them?” as their images 
flash before us once more. We then finally hear Godard reply, “yes, they were my 
friends.” 
I find this sequence remarkable, and quite moving for a several reasons. Firstly, I 
think it’s worth reading the exchange between Godard and the couple as a direct critique 
of Histoire(s) du cinéma writ large. Which is to say, Histoire(s) unabashedly conforms to 
notions of auteur worship and certainly draws its many images and ideas from works that 
are canonized in this way. But, this is a critique that Godard seems to be fully aware of 
himself and even embraces. How could it not be? As confounding as Histoire(s) is at 
times in registering its meaning it is still Godard’s “heart” that is largely on display 




Granted, this is an overly sentimental statement, but I think it deserves to be 
mulled over. Why would we ever need more heart? What would this entail? The heart is a 
resilient organ, a tough muscle, it has to be in order circulate blood through our bodies. 
But, more importantly it is the organ that animates us and allows our bodies to move.  If 
we remember correctly, montage is also the “heart” of Godard’s cinema and it is through 
montage that Godard animates the past for us; wakes it from its slumber and unsettles its 
being.  In other words, it is through this artistic practice that cinema and its history comes 
to life in movement. What White, Heidegger, and now Godard seem to suggest all along 
is that a poetic way of seeing, making, and being in the world is necessary if any concept 
of possibility or difference is to be sustained.  
And yet, “heart” in this context means much more than merely an abstract notion 
of animation, but also affection, a sensitivity, or even love. In other words, we must be 
sensitive to our craft as thinkers, historians, or filmmakers as well as to the poetic 
revealing at work in art and across the whole of being. This sensitivity to our craft could 
of course take shape in many different ways, but perhaps its most instructive form could 
be found in the notion of apprenticeship.  
But what precisely is meant by an apprenticeship? In Gilles Deleuze’s Proust and 
Signs we perhaps find a proper model. For Deleuze signs are “the object of a temporal 
apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge.”73  In other words, signs are learning 
objects that we come to know over time.  As Deleuze illustrates, “one becomes a 
carpenter by becoming sensitive to the signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





to the signs of disease.”  As Deleuze notes, “everything that teaches us something emits 
signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs.”74  To put it 
another way, it is the task of the apprentice to interpret or think about the signs around 
him or her and be sensitive to their presence.    
Deleuze then goes on to explain that love is also one of several circles in Proust’s 
Search that is central to apprenticeship.  To love someone or something is to 
“individualize someone by the signs he bears or emits.  It is to become sensitive to these 
signs, to undergo an apprenticeship to them”75. In other words, the beloved also appears 
as a sign that is an unknown world to us that must be interpreted.  Deleuze proposes that 
an apprenticeship of signs also involves pluralism for loved beings.  As Deleuze notes, 
“what is involved, here, is a plurality of worlds, the pluralism of love does not concern 
only the multiplicity of loved beings, but the multiplicity of souls or worlds in each of 
them.  To love is to try to explicate, to develop these unknown worlds that remain 
enveloped within the beloved.”76 To put it another way, the various worlds of my beloved 
are never solely mine to explore. It is entirely possible that others might have experienced 
my beloved’s various worlds before me.  Ultimately, my relationship with my beloved is 
never static, but instead reveals itself to be a kind of unfolding through the explication of 
new worlds in my beloved.  
It is in this way, as an apprentice, that we must become sensitive to the signs of 
movement and difference if we are to think about history as anything but merely re-
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presentation. Godard’s Histoire(s) leaves us with a potential model for thinking cinema 
history in movement as a poetic revealing. In other words, Godard’s Histoire(s) 
demonstrates that there is always more to ask about our history, always more to seek. As 
apprentices to movement there are entire worlds of meaning still left to explore and find 
new possibilities in, even in what has previously been “settled” or demarcated as 
“known.”  It is possible for all of us committed to thinking about cinema history to be 
apprentices like Godard’s friends: Becker, Truffuat, Franju, Rossellini, Melville, etc. This 
does not mean that we must all become filmmakers, but merely have a “heart” oriented 
towards the poetic possibilities of revealing the world, whether through historiography, 
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